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Abstract 
 
There has been a dearth of published research exploring the scientific ideas that young 
children construct, particularly in prestigious periodicals in the science education genre. 
The current article discusses the reasons behind this lack of prominence, and suggests 
ways forward that may link work from the field of developmental psychology with the 
findings of educational research conducted with older children. A recent innovation, 
learning progressions, is offered as a potential theoretical basis for providing these 
links. 
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Introduction 
  
 Between birth and 7-8 years children quickly mature in a variety of different 
ways (Doherty & Hughes, 2009). There is a vast amount of literature concerning this 
early years child development that deals with how their abilities advance “...physically, 
socially, emotionally, cognitively and linguistically” (Johnston, 2005, p1). Research in 
the developmental cognitive domain has been largely conducted by psychologists, not 
educationalists; one consequence of this being that at present, studies involving 
preschoolers’ science concepts are all but absent from the four most prominent journals 
in the field of science education. The current article will first consider some of this 
developmental psychology research and how it can be relevant to science educators, 
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and then later discuss potential ways forward that may help increase the profile of early 
years science in the literature.  
 Classic theorists have presented models of how children’s cognitive abilities 
progress throughout childhood, the best known of which is probably Piaget’s stages of 
cognitive development (Piaget, 1972). For Piaget, a child’s view of the world and the 
way it works is different in nature as well as degree of sophistication from that of an 
adult (Driver, Asoko, Leach, Mortimer & Scott, 1994). He proposed that there are 
periods during childhood that each individual passes through, and each period, or 
‘stage’, is characterised by particular qualities of thinking (Atherton, 2009). Each stage 
is markedly different to the others and children pass from one stage to the next in a 
predictable way, once an approximate age is reached. For instance, the concrete 
operational stage (7-11 years) is concerned with thinking about perceptual attributes of 
cases, while during the formal operational stage (11-16) abstract thought is developed 
(Piaget, 1972; Atherton, 2009).  
 Contemporaries of Piaget, Bruner and colleagues formulated their own theory of 
child development that similarly delineated a predictable sequence of periods, with 
thinking evolving from being image-based to symbol-based (Bruner, Goodnow & Austin, 
1967). Vygotsky also shared many of Piaget's assumptions about the way that children 
learn; however he highlighted the importance of the social context of learning (Mooney, 
2000). In Vygotsky’s theory, both teachers and older or more experienced children play 
a very important role in the children’s learning, opposing Piaget's cognitive theory in 
which the teacher plays a limited role (Smidt, 2009; Vygotky, 1978).   
 The above and other classic theorists had significant and lasting effects on 
education, particularly Piaget, whose stage model was readily accepted in a variety of 
educational contexts, with countless programmes and curricula having since been 
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written based on the Piagetian view (Mooney, 2000).  However, in spite of Piaget’s 
early, enduring popularity, nearly all modern cognitive psychologists now refute his 
stage model. Research has since demonstrated that there is little evidence for a stepwise 
progression of phases that is highly dependent on age (Doherty & Hughes, 2009). 
Classic discontinuous models of stepwise cognitive development often view children as 
solitary learners, failing to take into account the possible effects of social influences. For 
example, Johoda (1983) found that Zimbabwean 9 year-olds who worked in the family 
business were able to understand the abstract concept of profit, something that British 
children were not able to grasp until 11-12 years. Children raised in different cultures 
will construct concepts that reflect not only their current degree of cognitive 
development but also the norms and practices of those cultures. In the same vein, 
Vygotsky (1978) explained how in diverse cultures there are differences in social 
interactions which lead to a cultural variance in the acquisition of cognitive abilities. 
 As a result, classic stepwise theories may give the impression that the 
development of cognitive abilities is predetermined, or ‘hardwired’, with step changes 
occurring automatically when triggered by chronological age. Instead, modern 
constructivist theories of development assume that a child’s abilities are experience-
mediated and not age-mediated – i.e. concepts build up steadily over a period of time 
and depend wholly on the life experiences of each child. Therefore, a child’s formal 
education, interactions with parents and peers, and contact with entertainment and 
other media are crucial factors for development. These views correspond with those of 
constructivist science educators such as Posner, Strike, Kewson and Gertzog (1982) 
who state that previous constructions are a major governing influence on new learning 
(see later). 
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Conceptual development in the early years  
 
 Historically, pre-schoolers’ conceptions of science were not investigable as it was 
perceived that children could not understand scientific phenomena (de Kock, 2005). 
However, brain development research proves that a young brain develops rapidly 
neurologically during the first years of life (Doidge, 2007). Within the first 18 weeks of 
life, neurogenesis (production of neurons, i.e. nerve cells) occurs at an average rate of 
500,000 per minute (Elliot, 1999). Using glial cells to guide them, these neurons migrate 
to their genetically preordained place forming neurological connections which will be 
used to make sense of experiences (Eliot, 1999; Zull, 2002).  Nowadays, research has 
begun to accept that the learning of concepts and conceptual change is in the centre of 
young children’s learning of science (Nussbaum, 1989).  
Scientific concepts can be seen as “those ideas or general notions of the common 
attributes of objects or events that help us to understand the natural and physical world 
around us” (Bradley, 1996, p.43). Vygotsky (1986) defines ‘scientific concepts’ as those 
concepts which are introduced in formal education (e.g. by a teacher), whereas he sees 
‘spontaneous concepts’ as those which are acquired by children’s outside contexts in 
which explicit instruction is in place. He also refers to the concept of “mediation” which 
leads to the development of a “non-deterministic account in which the individual acts 
upon and is acted upon by social, cultural and historical factors” (Daniel, 2002, p.14). 
Alternatively, Johnston (2005) divided children’s concepts into 3 different categories: 
“factual knowledge” refers to concepts developed through first-hand experiences or 
secondary sources (television and books), “fictional knowledge or myths” refers to 
secondary sources of knowledge (tales and stories) whereas “inferred knowledge” is 
about those concepts that result from an interaction between children’s practical 
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experiences and the existing concepts that they hold. The last category may lead to 
concepts that are not completely accurate and can have a profound influence on further 
conceptual development (Johnston, 2005).  
In all cases, scientific concepts are formed as a result of previous experiences 
sand they can affect children’s learning of science (Eaton, Anderson and Smith, 1984). 
The main avenue for young children’s scientific learning development is the information 
shared within their environment including, but not limited to, verbal interactions, skills 
demonstration, television, books, museum visits and of course play (Bradley, 1996; 
Hollins, Whitby, Lander, Parson & Williams, 2001; de Kock, 2005; McGinn, 1998). For 
instance, when children use a see-saw, they experience that by pushing up one end of 
the see-saw, the other end will go down, even if they may not be able to verbalise their 
understanding in terms of physics.  Even bath time can be a stimulus for children since 
while playing with bath toys, they can experience sinking and floating (when they push 
bath toys under the water some of them will sink and some others will come back up). 
As a result, pre-schoolers’ physical and social experiences explorations support 
the development of their scientific understanding (Johnston, 2005). Children use their 
everyday experience to develop their scientific concepts which they then divide into 
smaller “sub-concepts” to help make them less abstract and more specific and 
restrictive (Bradley, 1996). The concepts and sub-concepts developed are then 
employed to identify patterns and relationships between the way things are made and 
the way they behave, whether it is the different forms that water can exist (liquid, gas or 
solid) or why and how a shadow appears.  
These firm cognitive concepts are very closely linked to children’s personal 
experiences, which can be wide ranging and diverse even if they are sometimes limited 
in understanding (Johnston, 2005). This can have a remarkable influence on the 
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children’s subsequent cognitive development since the information capability of each 
child can set limits on the complexity of concepts that the child is able to cope with 
(Kambouri, 2015). Consequently, Guest (2003), highlights that conceptual development 
is not solely about becoming faster or fuller of knowledge, since the qualitative changes 
taking place when children are processing new information are equally (or even more) 
important than the speed of the process or the quantity of the new knowledge acquired. 
 
An overview of cognitive research 
Despite the wealth of research in the developmental psychology genre, there is 
currently a dearth of studies that has investigated the nature of preschoolers’ 
substantive science concepts - that is to say, those scientific ideas which are listed 
within programmes or syllabi such as the English National Curriculum (Department for 
Education, 2013). Substantive concepts tend to focus on science facts and 
understanding, and exclude process skills that fall within the category of scientific 
enquiry. Treagust (1988) adds that most researchers followed Piaget’s approach to 
probing children’s ideas, using interviews.  
 For example, Osborne and Cosgrove (1983) investigated children’s ideas in 
relation to ice melting, water boiling, evaporating, and condensing. These events were 
shown to children, during individual interviews, requiring the children to discuss and 
explain the phenomenon taking place (Osborne and Cosgrove, 1983). Similarly, Eaton, 
Anderson and Smith (1984), looked into children’s scientific concepts in relation to 
light, using observations and audio-recordered lessons (Eaton, Anderson and Smith, 
1984). The results indicate that children had difficulties in learning about light because 
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neither their text nor their teachers dealt with their students’ prior knowledge and 
misconceptions adequately.  
 A few years later, Gelman (1990) asked 4-5 year-olds what kinds of things were 
inside the bodies of animals (specifically people, elephants, cats, mice and birds). 
Common to all of the animals were blood, bones and heart, and individual animals were 
thought to have characteristic things inside them, with elephants containing water, 
mice, cheese, and birds, feathers. In a study about how preschoolers consider kinship 
and family, children tended to attribute the same biological qualities to animals that 
they had been told were related to each other in a familial way, even though they looked 
different (Springer, 1992).  
 Au (1194) explored some fundamental chemistry ideas of 3-5 year-olds, 
reporting that they were able to appreciate concepts of conservation of matter, 
including the understanding that a smaller piece taken from a larger chunk of material 
possesses the same properties as that larger chunk. Palmer (1995) used semi‐
structured interviews to identify young children's (3-4 year olds) ideas and 
understanding of waste management and Kalish (1996) looked at 3-5 year-olds’ ideas 
about the causes of illness, finding that children understood that germs can be the cause 
of disease but tended to under-generalise, attributing other causes to diseases that were 
actually germ-mediated and involved contagion or contamination.  
 As a result, most research examples include ideas about how light or electricity 
travels, how water changes states, where in the body food is digested, and what we can 
do to a material to make it permanently change into something else. This scarcity of 
relevant work means that preschool science conceptual research remains a rich vein for 
exploitation by education researchers. Findings from the psychological literature tend 
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to focus on the measurement of children’s reasoning faculties, with none of the clear 
links to teaching or pedagogy that is usually found in education articles. 
There has been more research on preschoolers’ substantive concepts in the 
science education genre, particularly recently, with these studies having more relevance 
to the science curricula taught in schools. For instance, Ravanis and Bagakis (1998) 
implemented a teaching intervention aiming to identify and change pre-schoolers’ 
mental representations of water’s gasification. The sample were 49 pre-school children 
that were randomly and the researchers used a pre-test and a post-test, one month 
before and one month after the intervention, to establish children’s ideas on an 
individual level.  The tests asked for children to predict what would happen during an 
experiment demonstration on gasification as well as for their comments on a number of 
pictures shown to them representing the same phenomenon (Ravanis & Bagakis, 1998). 
The study’s results indicate that children were not able to predict the phenomenon 
(during the pre-test) while children’s answers were evidently effected by their 
individual experiences. Some children gave sufficient answers in relations to ‘where the 
water goes’ during gasification, whereas some others made hypotheses and gave 
answers affected from the experimental apparatus (e.g. into the bottle, into the desk) 
(Ravanis & Bagakis, 1998).  
Valanides, Gritsi, Kampeza and Ravanis (2000) interviewed 33 pre-school 
children, using semi-structured interviews, aiming to identify and change their concepts 
of the day/night cycle. The children were randomly selected from an urban 
kindergarten of a mixed socio-economic status and none of them had previously 
received any formal or informal instruction concerning the respective topics. A teaching 
intervention was designed and implemented, aiming to teach pre-schoolers about the 
Sun and the Earth and the day/night cycle. The intervention was delivered by the 
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researchers to small groups of children (6-7) and lasted for approximately thirty 
minutes. The effect was evaluated two weeks later using an interview similar to the one 
used prior to the intervention. Valanides et al. (2000) argue that most children more 
easily accepted that the Sun and the Earth are different spherical objects, but less easily 
that endorsed the idea that day and night relates to the Earth’s rotation on its axis. The 
children appeared to struggle with the idea of the Earth moving around the Sun and 
around its axis at the same time. The results indicate that children are not passive 
receivers of information and they bring their own views of the world to any teaching 
learning situation and these views, when not acknowledge, can interfere with their 
scientific learning (Valanides et al., 2000).  
A few years later, Gallegos-Cázares et al. (2009) were interested in preschoolers’ 
grasp of light concepts. They found that children understood that when mixing paints 
that different colours can be produced, but some incorrectly deduced that the end 
colour always depends on which of the starting colours were the ‘strongest’. Children 
also displayed misconceptions concerning shadows, including the ideas that shadows 
are objects themselves, are reflections of objects or have to be the same colour as the 
object. Similarly, Windt et al. (2014) looked at how science process skills could best be 
taught to a sample of 221 5-6 year olds, giving differing degrees of autonomy to children 
while they conducted experiments. They found that although most children were 
capable of working autonomously, they learned more science only when they were less 
autonomous and given clear directions by nursery teachers.  
In a study that examined children’s ideas of natural phenomena, Saçkes et al. 
(2010) found that although many 4-6 year-olds understood that rain was water, and 
came from the clouds, some believed clouds bring water, but rain falls from the sky, 
and/or that when rain hits the ground it disappears and ceases to exist. They 
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recommend that a basic understanding of the water cycle would likely help children 
construct appropriate scientific ideas of natural phenomena such as rainfall. Research 
into preschool substantive science concepts has hardly ever considered how ideas 
change over time and how these changes relate to early years cognitive development 
theory. As discussed, there is a notable absence of this research from the four 
prestigious science education journals, which may be due to less enthusiastic editors 
who choose not to publish the material because of a perceived lack of reader-interest, or 
perhaps a shortage of submissions that reach the required quality.  
 
Misconceptions and conceptual change 
 
 The conceptual change movement is generally considered to have started in 
earnest with the publication of one of the field’s seminal papers by Posner, Strike, 
Hewson and Hertzog of Cornell University in 1982.  Posner et al. argued that changing a 
learner’s current way of thinking about a science theory is not necessary a 
straightforward matter, as they firstly need to be consciously dissatisfied about that 
theory as a valid representation. Any new, replacement theory will only be accepted if is 
intelligible – is able to be understood; plausible - can solve present problems that the 
old theory cannot; and fruitful - can solve any new problems. Their views were 
grounded in earlier work by Kuhn (1962, paradigm shifts) and Piaget (1977, cognitive 
disequilibrium).  
 This realisation that conceptual change is complex yet potentially achievable 
within any science topic area by following certain steps, led to the explosion of so-called 
misconception research that began in the early 1980s and is still prevalent today (Allen, 
2014). The term ‘misconception’ is used to refer to the children’s conceptions which 
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differ from those generally accepted by the scientific community (Guest, 2003; 
Kambouri, 2015). In previous research and literature, this term can be also found as 
‘preconceptions’ (Ausubel, 1968; Kambouri, 2012), and ‘alternative frameworks’ 
(Driver, 1981) whereas other authors have also used labels such us ‘alternative 
conceptions’, ‘intuitive theory’, ‘non-scientific ideas’ and ‘children’s ideas’ (Guest, 2003; 
Hamza & Wickman, 2008). What is mostly important though about children’s science 
misconceptions is that they can be an obstacle to children’s conceptual development 
when learning science.  Stepans and Kuehn (1995) pointed out that misconceptions can 
make learning more difficult for children who will straggle to accept, learn and 
remember. 
 It has been repeatedly stated that science misconceptions have their origins in 
experiences during early childhood but there is a surprising lack of research evidence 
that has demonstrated this. There is, however, a good number of conceptual change 
studies that have focused the scientific ideas on older children aged 5-11 years (Allen, 
2014). If clear links could be made between this established body of work and what 
preschoolers are thinking, it would help ‘fill in the gaps’ and inform theory about how 
science ideas are first formed, with a view to designing interventions that encourage the 
construction of acceptable ideas at preschool level. One of the current authors has 
suggested such an approach could be called conceptual creation (Allen, 2015).  
  
The future of science learning 
 
 A recent innovation takes the idea of linking children’s developing ideas further 
by formally recognising that changing science ideas can typically take predictable 
trajectories throughout a child’s schooling (preschooling included) (Allen, 2016). When 
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a child is first taught a particular scientific idea, they do not necessarily leave the 
classroom with a complete, coherent or even a correct version of that idea (Harlen, 
2010). It usually takes time for them to construct a final, finished concept that teachers 
can regard as scientifically acceptable. This may involve the idea changing several times 
as a succession of different ‘mental drafts’ are constructed over time. Each successive 
version becomes more sophisticated and closer to the scientific version. This string of 
changing concepts is a learning progression and shows how ideas naturally unfold over 
time (Plummer & Krajcik, 2010). 
 As stated, learning progressions are a relatively recent innovation. They first 
emerged during the mid-2000s from mathematics education in America and were 
subsequently included as a key aspect of US curricula within the the Next Generation 
Science Standards (NRC, 2012). The learning progression approach requires teachers to 
present science ideas as a tightly-defined sequence during the teaching of a topic. These 
sequences are designed to encourage the retention of correct ideas and the rejection of 
incorrect features by presenting concepts in the precise order that they would naturally 
appear in children. Part of the rationale for this is to teach a curriculum that is informed 
by conceptual research, which is in contrast to curricula that have been devised by 
subject experts in a top-down way, not necessarily linked to the sequence in which 
children normally construct their changing ideas.  
 Figure 1 is an example of a learning progression that is focussed on the different 
topics of Animals including humans as they are listed by the English National Curriculum 
(DfE, 2013). The P shows progression of concepts over the ages of 5-11 years that has 
used several conceptual research studies as a source. It can be seen that many of the 
concepts morph over this period into more sophisticated variants, while others remain 
unchanged. Kambouri (2015) highlights the importance of acknowledging children’s 
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misconceptions when planning and teaching science, and to achieve learning 
progression, it is necessary to elicit children’s ideas prior to delivering the teaching 
sequence in order for each child’s current state of attainment to be located on the LP. 
prior to delivering the teaching sequence children’s ideas. Work can thereafter be 
differentiated accordingly, with children being supported to reach the next level of the 
LP. It is important that the process be hierarchical in that concepts at the lower reaches 
of the LP should be securely understood before higher concepts are introduced. One 
perhaps controversial aspect is that it is acceptable for the child to attain ‘halfway 
house’ concepts that do not completely reflect correct science. Referring to figure 1, 
when learning about the concept of living, young children deciding whether or not 
something is alive can focus exclusively on whether or not it has eyes. If children are 
secure with this idea then it should be initially encouraged, but later built upon by 
introducing processes of life other than the ability to sense, as well as introducing 
examples of living things that do not possess eyes (notably plants). Although figure 1 
has columns for the typical ages of children, it must not be assumed that only children at 
a particular age are only capable of understanding certain ideas. The word ‘typical’ is 
important here, and within the same class of children individuals will not all be at the 
same level, some will lay at the upper end of the LP, while others at the lower end. 
 
Research examples supporting learning progression 
 
 It is currently difficult to produce learning progression for ages less than 5 years 
due to a lack of substantive science conceptual research, and as noted earlier, the 
studies into preschoolers’ science concepts that is available tends not to describe how 
ideas change over time. In the final section of this paper we present exemplars of our 
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own research that may go some way towards correcting this imbalance. The first study 
looked at 3-5 year-old’s ideas of animal classification, asking them to categorise plastic 
models of animals into the sets fish, amphibians, reptiles, birds, mammals and insects 
(Allen, 2015). We also asked the children the reasons for their choices in order to 
determine set criteria. The fish data yielded interesting results. At 3 years, children 
tended to correctly place models of angelfish and clownfish into the fish category, basing 
their choices solely on physical attributes such as the model has fins and a tail and looks 
‘fish-like’. In contrast, the 5 year-olds incorrectly decided other models were fish such as 
the crab, jellyfish, starfish and octopus. This was notable since it represented a decline 
in scientific knowledge with age; that is to say, the 3 year-olds outperformed the 5 year-
olds, largely because the older children thought that any animal that lived in the sea and 
was capable of swimming was a fish. Other research with pupils aged 5-16 years has 
shown that between the ages of 5-11, this same belief was also prevalent but then start 
to improve after 11 years because the incorrect species were starting to be omitted 
from pupils’ fish sets, which constitutes U-shaped development of ideas over time 
(figure 2).  
 The second study examined the relationship between learning progression and 
teachers’ awareness of children’s misconceptions aiming to examine whether children’s 
ideas are more successfully altered when teachers are aware of the learners’ 
misconceptions (Kambouri, 2011). To investigate this, an experimental case study was 
designed and two kindergarten classes (4-5 year old children) participated.  A lesson on 
‘Rain and the Water Cycle’ was observed, while being delivered by the classroom’s 
teacher, and three randomly selected children were interviewed before and after each 
lesson. The children were interviewed in groups, which encouraged their engagement 
and helped to identify their misconceptions in relation to the specific topic. The 
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children’s answers from the first group were shared with the classroom children, 
something that did not happen for the case of the second group. The results showed a 
considerable difference between the learning progression when comparing the two 
groups, since the responses collected during the post-interviews with the children from 
the first group, who provided more correct answers and expressed fewer 
misconceptions, indicated a greater development and progress in their understanding 
of the specific phenomenon. Based on this case study, it is more likely for children to 
overcome their misconceptions when teachers take their initial misconceptions into 
account as they plan and teach science lessons (Kambouri, 2011). 
 The last study looked at how 3-5 year-olds think about the kinds of food that 
animals eat (Allen, manuscript in preparation). We presented children with a series of 
simple three-step food chains, including grass→rabbit→fox and grass→zebra→lion. 
Children then chose which animal in each food chain was the predator, which was the 
prey, and whether any of the animals were herbivores and would eat the plant. The 
older children were more able to correctly identify predator, prey and herbivore, and 
also correctly recognise that the reason why the predator chased the prey was because 
it wanted to eat it – in contrast, the younger children tended not to know what 
happened next after the predator had caught the prey. Only as more studies are 
completed that characterise how preschoolers’ concepts change over time will we be 
able to construct learning progressions that can be of use to early years practitioners 
and inform their delivery of relevant, science material. 
 
Concluding comments 
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The lack of studies of science conceptual development at the preschool level presents a 
golden opportunity for researchers to lay down firm foundations for how learning 
progressions originate in children’s early thinking. These findings would link together 
with the body of work that has shown how older children’s scientific ideas develop 
during the primary years, providing, ideally, a seamless continuum that both early years 
practitioners and primary teachers could utilise to plan and deliver lessons based on 
common theory. Evidentially-sourced teaching is coming increasingly to the fore in 
England, which can only facilitate these processes, encouraging and inspiring 
researchers, and hopefully teachers themselves, to take teaching forward into the 21st 
Century and help transform the profession into one which is strongly guided by and a 
generator of usable, valid research.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Figure 1 How learning progresses: Animals including humans (adapted from Allen, 
2016). 
 
 Typically 5-7 years Typically 8-9 years Typically 10-11 years 
Concept of living Anything with eyes and 
moving legs is alive. 
Anything capable of self-
directed movement is alive. 
Animals and artefacts are 
alive; plants are non-living. 
Anything capable of self-
directed movement is alive. 
Animals and artefacts are 
alive; plants are non-living. 
Anything capable of self-directed 
movement is alive. 
Animals and plants are alive; artefacts 
are non-living. 
 
Animal growth Animals need food to grow; 
growing takes place only at 
particular times (e.g. during 
sleeping). 
Animals need food to grow; 
growing takes place only at 
particular times (e.g. during 
sleeping). 
Animals need food to grow which makes 
them stretch or get bigger; growing takes 
place only at particular times (e.g. during 
sleeping). 
Why do we eat? To stay alive, keep healthy, to 
grow. 
To stay alive, keep healthy, to 
grow. 
To stay alive, keep healthy, to grow. 
 
Anatomical location of 
the stomach 
Circular organ in the 
abdomen, about the level of 
the navel. 
Circular organ in the 
abdomen, about the level of 
the navel; a tube connects the 
mouth to the stomach. 
Circular organ in the abdomen, about the 
level of the navel; a tube connects the 
mouth to the stomach. 
The fate of ingested 
food 
Food goes to the stomach and 
remains there unchanged (or) 
food enters the body cavity 
and ends up unchanged 
throughout the body, 
including at the ends of arms 
and legs (hollow bag model); 
solids and liquids take 
separate pathways through 
the body. 
Food goes to the stomach 
(poor understanding of the 
fate of food beyond the 
stomach); the body breaks 
food down into smaller pieces 
to help extract nourishment; 
solids and liquids take 
separate pathways through 
the body. 
Food goes to the stomach (poor 
understanding of the fate of food beyond 
the stomach); the body breaks food down 
into smaller pieces to help extract 
nourishment; solids and liquids take 
separate pathways through the body. 
Starts to think about the digestive system 
as a differentiated tube of different 
organs. 
Egestion of food All ingested food leaves the 
body through the bottom (or) 
faeces is not related to 
digestion at all. 
Some food leaves the body 
through the bottom, the rest 
is kept inside the body. 
Some food leaves the body through the 
bottom, the rest is kept inside, being sent 
around the body in the blood. 
Skeleton Bones are often dumbbell-
shaped. 
Bones are often dumbbell-
shaped; they support the rest 
of the body; they are not 
living tissue. 
Bones are often dumbbell-shaped; they 
support the rest of the body; they are 
living tissue because they grow and can 
repair themselves. 
Muscular system Muscles are located 
exclusively in the arms and 
legs. 
Muscles are located 
exclusively in the arms and 
legs. 
Muscles are located exclusively in the 
arms and legs. 
Starts to link muscles with movement. 
Location of the heart Drawn as a ‘valentine’ shape 
in the abdomen. 
Drawn as a ‘valentine’ shape 
in the left side of the chest. 
Drawn as a ‘valentine’ shape in the left 
side of the chest. 
Blood circulation The heart beats; blood is a red 
liquid that keeps you alive; 
blood splashes around freely 
inside the body and is not 
contained by blood vessels; 
poor understanding of the 
double circulation. 
The heart beats; it pumps 
blood around the body; blood 
is a red liquid that keeps you 
alive; blood is found in veins; 
poor understanding of the 
double circulation. 
The heart beats; it pumps blood around 
the body; blood is a red liquid that keeps 
you alive; blood is found in veins; poor 
understanding of the double circulation. 
Starts to appreciate that the blood is a 
transport system that carries different 
substances around the body. 
Respiratory system. Lungs are unknown; the 
stomach or abdomen is 
responsible for breathing (or) 
air is breathed in, circulates 
freely inside the head (or 
inside an empty body), and 
then breathed out. 
There are two lungs that 
connect with the mouth by a 
tube; actual position of the 
lungs is not well known 
(sometimes placed in the 
abdomen). 
There are two lungs that connect with the 
mouth by a tube; actual position of the 
lungs is not well known (sometimes 
placed in the abdomen); lungs help give 
oxygen to the blood (or) air enters the 
lungs then passes directly to the heart via 
tubes. 
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Figure 2  U-shaped development of the fish concept over the ages 3-16 years. 
 
